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THE INTEGRITY RIGHT OF AN MP3:
HOW THE INTRODUCTION OF MORAL RIGHTS INTO U.S.
LAW CAN HELP COMBAT ILLEGAL PEER-TO-PEER MUSIC
FILE SHARING
Cassandra Spangler ∗
I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1999, a nineteen-year-old Northeastern University undergraduate named Shawn Fanning created a computer service called Napster that allowed users to access a peer-to-peer (“P2P”) network,
enabling music file sharing that would forever change the environ1
ment of the music industry. Upon launch, the number of Napster
2
users doubled every two days. At its peak, Napster had an estimated
3
forty million users. At the same time, entertainment industry sales
dropped rapidly; by 2003, the recorded music and film industries
4
were losing $7.6 billion annually due to piracy. File sharing has since
engendered a widely publicized controversy in the United States, fea-
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1
JOSEPH MENN, ALL THE RAVE: THE RISE AND FALL OF SHAWN FANNING’S NAPSTER
36 (2003).
2
Id. at 6.
3
Id. at 101.
4
LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE
LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY 63 (2004) (“The recording
industry estimates that it loses about $4.6 billion every year to physical piracy . . . .
The [Motion Picture Association of America] estimates that it loses $3 billion annually to worldwide piracy.”).

1299

SPANGLER (FINAL EDIT)

1300

1/28/2010 2:46 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:1299
5

turing the “content holders” (record labels) and the “downloaders”
6
(who are looking more and more like the American public ) as the
key players in this controversy. More than seven years of legal battles
have not come close to eradicating file sharing, with music sales down
7
thirty-six percent since 2000, leading many to conclude that the
8
record industry must adapt or else go the way of disco. While various
possible appropriate adaptations exist, this Comment discusses only
one—the implementation of moral-rights protection for musical artists in the United States.
There are two types of interests at stake in a work of art: econom9
ic interests and personality interests. Copyrights, which are strongly
recognized in the United States, protect economic interests, whereas
10
moral rights protect the artists’ personality interests. These interests
can often conflict. The United States chooses to favor copyrights
(i.e., economic rights) over moral rights. This focus on economic
rights implies that only the economic interest is worthy of legal protection, leading music to be viewed merely as a commodity. This
Comment argues that U.S. law ought to recognize moral rights for
musicians in order to shift the view of music as a commodity to music
as an art form with value beyond economics and to illustrate that musicians have a personal stake in their music. Finally, this Comment
argues that such a shift in the view of music and musicians would discourage illegal music-file sharing over the long term and thus help
the record industry survive the transition into the Digital Age.

5

It should be noted that, technically, these suits are usually against music uploaders (as opposed to downloaders); however, the term “downloader” will be used
in this Comment to refer generally to those that utilize P2P programs to share music
(both uploading and downloading) without permission from the copyright holder.
6
See WILLIAM W. FISHER III, PROMISES TO KEEP: TECHNOLOGY, LAW, AND THE
FUTURE OF ENTERTAINMENT 126 (2004) (noting that Recording Industry Association
of America (RIAA) lawsuits have targeted a diverse group of defendants, from a
twelve-year-old girl to a Yale professor).
7
Evan Serpick, EMI Changes the Game, ROLLING STONE, Mar. 6, 2008, at 19, 19; see
DAVID KUSEK & GERD LEONHARD, THE FUTURE OF MUSIC: MANIFESTO FOR THE DIGITAL
MUSIC REVOLUTION 101 (2005). In 2005, more files were downloaded illegally each
month than had typically been sold by the music industry each year, and the number
of downloaders continued to increase by more than 100% each year. Id.
8
See, e.g., FISHER, supra note 6, at 2 (suggesting that if widespread use of P2P systems continues, “the market for authorized sound recordings is bound to deteriorate”).
9
See Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectnal [sic] Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287,
330, 339 (1988) (characterizing moral rights as protecting personality interests).
10
See id.; Burton Ong, Why Moral Rights Matter: Recognizing the Intrinsic Value of Integrity Rights, 26 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 297, 304 (2003).
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Part II of this Comment provides a historical background of
moral rights. This background includes a definition of moral rights,
a contrast of moral rights with copyrights, a discussion of the countries that recognize moral rights, and an examination of the minimal
extent to which the United States protects moral rights. Part III argues that U.S. law recognizes moral rights to such a minimal extent
because the nation views art primarily as a commodity and that this
view of art as a commodity contributes to illegal music-file sharing.
This Comment then posits that the introduction of moral rights into
U.S. copyright law would help discourage illegal file sharing. Part IV
discusses reasons why record labels may initially be opposed to moralrights legislation and then argues that moral rights are nonetheless
necessary to help these record labels compete with ever-advancing
technologies, with which copyright lawsuits are unable to keep pace.
II. CONTRASTING EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN LEGAL
PROTECTION OF ARTISTIC WORKS
“Moral rights” and “copyrights” are both legal terms for groups
of rights vested in artistic works. However, the two differ greatly in
both the rights they afford and the theories used to justify those
rights. These differences are reflected in a comparison of nations
that legally recognize moral rights with nations that do not—with nations valuing art as a cultural contribution tending to recognize moral rights and nations viewing art as a commodity tending to disfavor
moral rights because of their potential to limit the value of copyrights.
A. Moral Rights as a “Bundle of Rights”: Protecting the Relationship
Between Artist and Artwork
Moral rights theory begins with the premise that an artist gives a
11
piece of herself through her work, resulting in a unique relationship
12
between the artist and the artwork. In other words, the art is an ex13
tension of the artist. Because of this special relationship, harm to
14
the art is thought to result in personal harm to the artist. Moral
rights seek to prevent this sort of harm by allowing the artist to retain
11

Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 71 F.3d 77, 81 (2d Cir. 1995); Kathryn A. Kelly,
Moral Rights and the First Amendment: Putting Honor Before Free Speech, 11 U. MIAMI ENT.
& SPORTS L. REV. 211, 211 (1994).
12
Susan P. Liemer, Understanding Artists’ Moral Rights: A Primer, 7 B.U. PUB. INT.
L.J. 41, 43 (1998).
13
Id.
14
Id.
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control over the creative process and the final product.
In this
16
sense, moral rights protect the artist’s “personality interest.”
17
Like copyrights, moral rights are a “bundle of rights,” with the
rights of attribution and integrity comprising the core of this bun18
19
dle. The right of attribution is the right to claim authorship of a
work and to “determine where and how the author’s name shall be
20
affixed to the work.” This right also includes the right not to claim
21
authorship—that is, to remain anonymous or to use a pseudonym.
This “helps ensure the artist’s name is attributed to all her work and
22
her work only.” Professor Susan Liemer describes this as “maintain23
ing an accurate chain of title to the creative process.”
The second core moral right is the right of integrity, which is the
right of the author to “prevent any deforming or mutilating changes
24
to his work.” This right prevents the alteration or public presentation of the work in a context that would “injure [the artist’s] honor
25
or reputation.” Whether or not this right prevents the complete de26
struction of a work is a current source of controversy.
Several other rights are sometimes included in the bundle of
moral rights. The right of disclosure is the right to decide when “a
27
work should be released to the public.” The right of withdrawal is
the corresponding right to decide whether the work should be retracted after being released “because it no longer reflects the author’s
28
personal convictions.” Resale royalty rights entitle the artist to a

15

Id. at 44.
See Hughes, supra note 9, at 339; Ong, supra note 10, at 304.
17
Kelly, supra note 11, at 212.
18
Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 71 F.3d 77, 81 (2d Cir. 1995).
19
The right of attribution is also known as the right to paternity. E.g., Liemer,
supra note 12, at 47.
20
Cyrill P. Rigamonti, Deconstructing Moral Rights, 47 HARV. INT’L L.J. 353, 363
(2006).
21
Carter, 71 F.3d at 81; Rigamonti, supra note 20, at 364.
22
Liemer, supra note 12, at 49.
23
Id. at 51.
24
Carter, 71 F.3d at 81.
25
Brian T. McCartney, “Creepings” and “Glimmers” of the Moral Rights of Artists in
American Copyright Law, 6 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 35, 38 (1998) (quoting Thomas F. Cotter, Pragmatism, Economics, and the Droit Moral, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1, 13 (1997)).
26
Compare Carter, 71 F.3d at 81 (“In some jurisdictions the integrity right also protects artwork from destruction.”), with Liemer, supra note 12, at 51 (“Traditionally,
the right of integrity does not protect the art work from total destruction by another.”).
27
Rigamonti, supra note 20, at 362.
28
Id.
16
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portion of the profits when others financially benefit from her work.
An additional moral right is the prohibition against excessive criticism, which protects the author against abusive and malicious criti30
cism of her work. Finally, moral rights may contain a broad prohibi31
tion against any other attacks on the personality of the creator.
B. Moral Rights as Distinguished from Copyrights
Moral rights and copyrights both protect artistic works, but each
protects different interests in those works. While copyrights protect
economic interests—the potential profit that derives from the work—
32
moral rights protect the artist’s personality interest. In this sense,
copyrights are essentially economic rights that are often understood
33
as property rights. In contrast, “moral rights are personal rights;
they are not based on any theory of property, for whatever ‘property’
the creator may possess exists in the rights protected by the copyright
34
statute.”
Moral rights exist independently of any property interest in the
35
36
work, hence moral rights exist independently of copyrights. Copyrights are insufficient to protect the artist’s personality interest because, while copyrights protect the economic exploitation of artistic
works, “when an artist creates . . . he does more than bring into the
37
world a unique object having only exploitative possibilities . . . .” In
addition to profit-making capability, artwork has the ability to affect
human emotion, cultivate new ideas, and serve as social commentary,
among other things. Such supra-economic reasons necessitate the
protection of artistic works; however, these additional reasons are not
protected by copyright statutes. As a result, moral rights theory developed beyond copyright protection to protect the non-economic
value of an artistic work.
Moral rights are not only independent of copyrights but also differ from copyrights in several key respects. First, each type of right
affords a different duration of protection. Moral rights are perpe-

29

Liemer, supra note 12, at 55.
Martin A. Roeder, Note, The Doctrine of Moral Right: A Study in the Law of Artists,
Authors, and Creators, 53 HARV. L. REV. 554, 572 (1940).
31
Id. at 573.
32
See Hughes, supra note 9, at 351; Ong, supra note 10, at 304.
33
E.g., LESSIG, supra note 4, at 83.
34
Roeder, supra note 30, at 564.
35
Liemer, supra note 12, at 44.
36
See Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 71 F.3d 77, 82 (2d Cir. 1995).
37
Roeder, supra note 30, at 557.
30
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tual, whereas copyrights are limited by statute. Additionally, moral
40
41
Copyrights can freely be
rights are, theoretically, unwaivable.
42
43
bought and sold, whereas moral rights are not transferable. Copyrights are attached to the work, whereas moral rights are attached to
the artist. This means that moral rights “remain vested in the artist
44
even after the work has been transferred.” While the moral right is
always granted to the creator, the copyright is almost always granted
45
to the owner of the work. In the American copyright system, the
creator is the original owner (unless the work is a work for hire or assignment); however, the creator almost always assigns the copyright
46
in a musical work to the record label. It is therefore not unique for
the author and the owner of a work, especially a musical work, to in
47
fact be different people. A final difference between copyrights and
moral rights lies in remedies. Whereas remedies for copyright in48
fringement usually take the form of money damages, moral-rights
violations usually entail equitable relief because “the injury suffered
by the creator will not be measurable in dollars and cents, although it
49
may well be irreparable.”

38

See RALPH E. LERNER & JUDITH BRESLER, ART LAW: THE GUIDE FOR COLLECTORS,
INVESTORS, DEALERS AND ARTISTS 1256 (3d ed. 2005) (imparting that moral rights are
inviolable).
39
See Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2006) (establishing that, as of 2007,
copyright term is author’s life plus seventy years if the owner is a natural person or
the shorter of 120 years after creation or ninety years after publication if the owner is
a corporation).
40
Some nations’ moral-rights statutes allow moral rights to be waived. See LERNER
& BRESLER, supra note 38, at 1256–57.
41
Id. at 1256.
42
See 17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(1)–(2) (establishing that copyrights can be transferred
in part or in whole).
43
See Boosey & Hawkes Music Publishers, Ltd. v. Walt Disney Co., No. 93 Civ.
0373 (KTD), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1643, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 17, 2000) (noting that
moral rights are not assignable); Liemer, supra note 12, at 44 (stating that the artist
cannot sell, give away, or bequeath moral rights).
44
LERNER & BRESLER, supra note 38, at 1255–56.
45
See Roeder, supra note 30, at 576 (“Copyright in America, as limited by statute,
was designed to protect only the exploitative value of creation; its protection is not
granted to the creator as such, but to the owner, the person having the power to exploit the creation.”).
46
See, e.g., Rajan Desai, Music Licensing, Performance Rights Societies, and Moral
Rights for Music: A Need in the Current U.S. Music Licensing Scheme and a Way to Provide
Moral Rights, 10 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 1, 18–19 (2001).
47
See Rigamonti, supra note 20, at 360.
48
See 17 U.S.C. § 504 (2006).
49
Roeder, supra note 30, at 574.

SPANGLER (FINAL EDIT)

2009]

1/28/2010 2:46 PM

COMMENT

1305

C. Moral Rights Are Generally a Continental European Phenomenon
Historically, continental Europe has recognized moral rights,
50
whereas Anglo-American countries have failed to do so. One author
51
succinctly characterizes this split as “droit d’auteur countries,” which
view intellectual property as tied to the author in a personal manner,
as opposed to “copyright countries,” which view intellectual property
52
as simply another form of property. As of 2003, eighty-one countries
of the world, including Mexico, Canada, France, Germany, and Sin53
54
gapore, recognized moral rights to varying extents. The European
55
Union also recognizes moral rights.
The French legal system provides the strongest existing protec56
tion for moral rights. It is thus no surprise that moral rights doc57
trine (known as “droit moral” ) was first developed in France during
58
the nineteenth century. This early droit moral doctrine was a hybrid
of decisions handed down in French courts and the modern view of
59
moral rights developing simultaneously in Germany. The French
60
moral-rights statute, codified in the Law of March 11, 1957, establishes the rights of attribution, integrity, and disclosure and states that
61
these rights are “perpetual, inalienable and imprescriptible.”

50

This has historically been true, although the United Kingdom adopted limited
moral-rights legislation in 1988. See Copyrights, Designs, and Patents Act, 1988, c. 48
(Eng.); Rigamonti, supra note 20, at 354.
51
Translated from French into English, meaning the “non-pecuniary, special
(personal) right of an author, artist, etc. in his work.” F.H.S. BRIDGE, THE COUNCIL OF
EUROPE FRENCH-ENGLISH LEGAL DICTIONARY 208 (1994).
52
Michèle Battisti, The Future of Copyright Management: European Perspectives
(Sept. 27, 2000), http://www.ifla.org/IV/ifla66/papers/140-184e.htm.
53
McCartney, supra note 25, at 71–72.
54
LEONARD D. DUBOFF & CHRISTY O. KING, ART LAW IN A NUTSHELL 203 (2000).
55
McCartney, supra note 25, at 71–72.
56
See Liemer, supra note 12, at 41; Kimberly Y.W. Holst, Article, A Case of Bad Credit?: The United States and the Protection of Moral Rights in Intellectual Property Law, 3
BUFF. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 105, 108 (2006).
57
“Droit moral” is treated as synonymous with “droit d’auteur,” meaning the “nonpecuniary, special (personal) right of an author, artists, etc. in his work.” BRIDGE, supra note 51, at 208.
58
See Liemer, supra note 12, at 41–42.
59
Natalie C. Suhl, Note, Moral Rights Protection in the United States Under the Berne
Convention: A Fictional Work?, 12 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1203,
1206–10 (2002).
60
JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN & ALBERT E. ELSEN, LAW, ETHICS, AND THE VISUAL ARTS
311 (4th ed. 2002).
61
Id.
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D. The Current State of Moral Rights in U.S. Law
Anglo-American copyright protection originates in the Statute of
62
Anne. In 1774, the British House of Lords held in Donaldson v. Beckett that no copyright protection existed beyond that granted by the
63
Statute of Anne. Since the Statute of Anne did not contain a moral64
rights provision, moral rights were held not to exist at common law.
This common-law focus on statutory interpretation bled into ear65
ly American copyright law. Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitu66
tion establishes copyright protection in the United States. Since the
Constitution, like the Statute of Anne, does not explicitly grant moral-rights protection, moral rights have been held not to exist in U.S.
67
copyright law. The stance that U.S. law affords no moral-rights protection was carried over into the twentieth century and made clear in
Vargas v. Esquire, in which the court held that while foreign countries
68
may recognize moral rights, the United States does not.
While art has been an important part of European culture for
69
centuries, the United States is a relatively young country and thus
has a shorter history generally and a lesser quantum of artistic history
specifically. Moreover, from its inception, the United States has been
less focused on art than continental European countries. Early U.S.
culture focused more on industry, with the nation quickly becoming
a leader in trade and manufacturing; therefore, “while the European
culture was marked with the works of great authors and artists, the
culture of the United States was filled with names like Ford, Carnegie,
70
and Rockefeller, who were leaders in industry.” The United States
71
has historically imported most of its art. In contrast, French art was
world-renowned for centuries prior to the development of the droit

62

See generally An Act for the Encouragement of Learning, by Vesting the Copies
of Printed Books in the Authors or Purchasers of Such Copies, During the Times
Therein Described, 1710, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Eng.); Susan P. Liemer, How We Lost Our
Moral Rights and the Door Closed on Non-Economic Values in Copyright, 5 J. MARSHALL REV.
INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 12–14 (2005).
63
Donaldson v. Beckett, (1774) 98 Eng. Rep. 257 (H.L.) (appeal taken from
Scot.).
64
Id.; Liemer, supra note 62, at 28–32.
65
Liemer, supra note 62, at 32–36.
66
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
67
See Liemer, supra note 62, at 34–35.
68
Vargas v. Esquire, Inc., 164 F.2d 522, 526 (7th Cir. 1947).
69
Holst, supra note 56, at 117–20.
70
Id. at 122.
71
Id.
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72

moral. U.S. law developed appropriately with this historical focus on
industry and lack of artistic tradition, providing more protection for
73
74
property rights and less protection for the arts. One author describes this phenomenon as follows: “Busy with the economic exploitation of her vast natural wealth, America has, perhaps, neglected the
arts; in any event American legal doctrine has done so, and the paucity of material outside the copyright law on the rights of creators
75
forms a vivid contrast to the continental jurisprudence.”
Although a leader in developing intellectual property, the United States waited more than one hundred years to join the Berne
Convention, an international copyright agreement first ratified in
76
1886 and boasting 163 national signatories as of 2007. This reluctance may be due in large part to the American desire not to recog77
nize moral rights. When the United States finally did join the Berne
Convention, the nation’s lack of moral-rights protection became a
source of controversy because Article 6bis of the Convention requires
signatories to recognize, at a minimum, the rights of attribution and
78
integrity.
Congress enacted the Berne Implementation Act in 1988 and of79
ficially joined the Berne Convention in 1989. The Berne Implementation Act states that U.S. adherence to the Berne Convention does
not “expand or reduce” authors’ rights to “claim authorship to the
work” (right to attribution) or “object to any distortion, mutilation,

72

See John Henry Merryman, The Refrigerator of Bernard Buffet, 27 HASTINGS L.J.
1023, 1042 (1976).
73
See FISHER, supra note 6, at 138 (arguing that legal rights known as “property
rules” enjoy greater protection in the United States); id. at 140 (stating that “[r]eal
property rights are highly favored by the law”).
74
See Hughes, supra note 9, at 288 (stating that “ideas about property have played
a central role in shaping the American legal order”).
75
Roeder, supra note 30, at 557.
76
See Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102
Stat. 2853 (1988).
77
McCartney, supra note 25, at 40–41.
78
See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works art.
6bis., Sept. 9, 1886, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 (rev., Paris, July 24, 1971) [hereinafter Berne Convention].
Independently of the author’s economic rights, and even after the
transfer of the said rights, the author shall have the right to claim authorship of the work and to object to any distortion, mutilation or other modification of, or other derogatory action in relation to, the said
work, which would be prejudicial to his honor or reputation.
Id.
79
See Berne Convention Implementation Act.
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or other modification” (right to integrity) of the work. This Act can
be fairly read to mean that the United States’ signing of the Berne
Convention does not grant authors the rights of attribution and integrity, despite the fact that membership to the Convention is conditioned on a nation’s guarantee of those rights.
Congress has taken some statutory steps to bring the United
States closer to compliance with the Berne Convention’s moral-rights
requirement. Congress enacted the Visual Artists’ Rights Act (VARA)
81
in 1990. VARA establishes the right to paternity and integrity and
the right to prevent destruction of the work if it is of “recognized sta82
83
ture.” However, VARA applies only to visual artists, so it is not relevant to this Comment on the protection of musical works. In addition to VARA, several states have enacted limited moral-rights
84
legislation. Like VARA, however, these state statutes apply only to

80
81
82

Id. § 3(b)(1)–(2).
Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a) (1990).
Id. § 106A(a)(1)–(3).
[T]he author of a work of visual art—
(1) shall have the right—
(A) to claim authorship of that work, and
(B) to prevent the use of his or her name as the author of any
work of visual art which he or she did not create; [and]
....
(A) to prevent any intentional distortion, mutilation, or modification of that work . . . , and
(B) to prevent any destruction of a work of recognized stature.

Id.
83

Id. § 106A(b) (establishing that “only the author of a work of visual art has the
rights conferred by subsection (a)”). Hansmann and Santilli postulate that VARA
and similar state statutes are limited to visual art because the economic value of visual
art is more dependent than other art forms on the artist’s reputation. Henry Hansmann & Marina Santilli, Authors’ and Artists’ Moral Rights: A Comparative Legal and Economic Analysis, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 95, 108–09 (1997); see also Brian A. Lee, Making
Sense of “Moral Rights”: Artists’ European-Style Intellectual Property Protections
within the American System 46 (Mar. 7, 2008) (unpublished comment, on file with
the
Yale
Law
School
Legal
Scholarship
Repository),
available
at
http://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1015&context=yale/ylsspps.
Lee
provides another reason for the limitation of VARA and state statutes to visual art,
postulating that visual art cannot be identically reproduced, whereas music, books,
and motion pictures can be; this necessitates a right of integrity for visual art and not
other art forms. Lee, supra, at 47; see also infra notes 84–85 (describing state statutes
similar to VARA).
84
See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 987 (West 2009) (establishing that “physical alteration or destruction of fine art, which is an expression of the artist’s personality, is detrimental to the artist’s reputation, and artists therefore have an interest in protecting their works of fine art against any alteration or destruction”).
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85

visual art and not to music. Furthermore, VARA may preempt these
86
state statutes.
How can the United States be both a member of the Berne Convention and seemingly violate its moral-rights requirement? Congress
sidesteps this issue by claiming that existing U.S. law adequately protects these interests through common-law causes of action, such as
unfair competition, copyright, contract, defamation, and the right to
87
privacy. However, these common-law causes of action are grossly insufficient in protecting, and are in fact often at odds with, moral
rights.
One way the United States arguably protects artists’ moral rights
is through trademark and unfair competition law under the Lanham
88
Act. The Lanham Act provides a cause of action against anyone who
89
creates a “false designation of origin.” Commentators argue that
this is comparable to the moral right of attribution because it pre90
vents false claims to authorship of works. A general problem with
this approach is that the Lanham Act is designed to protect economic
rights; it remedies the economic injury to the creator if he has been
91
unfairly deprived of a market. The Lanham Act does not, however,
92
protect the personal rights that moral rights preserve.
Commentators have also argued that U.S. copyright law protects
93
moral rights. For example, the compulsory-license doctrine allows
musicians to “cover” songs written by others but states that the artist

85

See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 987(b)(2) (protecting only “fine art” and defining
the term as “an original painting, sculpture, or drawing, or an original work of art in
glass”); N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW § 14.03(3)(e) (McKinney Supp. 2009) (stating
that “[t]he provisions of this section shall apply only to works of fine art”); see supra
note 83 (discussing possible reasons these statutes protect only visual art).
86
See Benjamin S. Hayes, Note, Integrating Moral Rights into U.S. Law and the Problem with the Works for Hire Doctrine, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1013, 1025 (2000); see also Kelly,
supra note 11, at 230.
87
McCartney, supra note 25, at 40–41.
88
15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2006).
89
Id. § 1125(a)(1)(A) (providing civil action against “any person who, on or in
connection with any goods or services . . . uses in commerce any . . . false designation of origin . . . which is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or deceive as
to the . . . origin”).
90
See Gilliam v. Am. Broad. Cos., 538 F.2d 14, 24–25 (2d Cir. 1976).
91
Roeder, supra note 30, at 568. See also Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox
Films Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 37 (2003) (holding that the Lanham Act only protects designation of manufacturing origin and not designation of creative origin).
92
See Dastar, 539 U.S. at 37; see supra notes 88–92 and accompanying text.
93
See Susan C. Anderson, Note, Decontextualization of Musical Works: Should the Doctrine of Moral Rights Be Extended?, 16 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 869,
874–75 (2006).
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covering the song shall not “change the basic melody or fundamental
94
character of the work,” which is arguably akin to the right of integrity. However, the compulsory-license doctrine only protects the copy95
right owner, who is often not the creator. Moreover, it protects only
96
copyrighted works and expires with the copyright. Moral rights pro97
tect all artistic works and are perpetual.
Contract doctrine is the third U.S. legal regime claimed to protect moral rights because artists are, in theory, “free to insist on moral
98
rights provisions in their contracts.” However, artists usually have
very little bargaining power, particularly at the start of their careers,
99
and have little knowledge of their contract rights. Accordingly, artists often cannot afford to, or do not know to, insist on moral-rights
100
provisions in their contracts. Not only is contract law inadequate at
protecting moral rights, but it often undermines the very protection
moral rights afford. If freedom of contract is given priority over moral rights, moral rights can be waived in contract. Due to the large
disparity in bargaining power between content providers and artists,
content providers would likely always insist that artists opt out of
101
moral-rights provisions in their contracts.
III. TENSIONS BETWEEN MORAL RIGHTS AND ECONOMIC RIGHTS
Formal recognition of moral rights would establish legal interests that conflict with economic interests. Because U.S. policy seeks
to retain priority for economic rights while also complying with the
Berne Convention (in order to provide greater international protection for its economic rights-holders), the legislature has traditionally
94

17 U.S.C. § 115(a)(2) (2006); Anderson, supra note 93, at 874.
Roeder, supra note 30, at 566; see supra notes 44–47 and accompanying text.
96
17 U.S.C. § 115(a)(2).
97
See supra text accompanying note 38.
98
See Merryman, supra note 72, at 1043. This sentiment was echoed by nowJustice Stephen Breyer, who once wrote that statutory moral-rights protection is unnecessary because existing copyright law “provides a protective umbrella beneath
which author and publisher can work out, in their contract, safeguards for the author.”
Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies,
and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281, 290 (1970).
99
Merryman, supra note 72, at 1043.
100
Id.
101
This was in fact the result after the relatively recent United States Supreme
Court decision in N.Y. Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483 (2001). In this case, the
Court gave freelance journalists something akin to a moral right when it held that although publishers own the copyright to the collective work, they do not have the
right to present the authors’ individual articles out of context. See id. at 488, 493–97.
However, the Court noted that this pseudo-moral right can freely be contracted away.
See id. at 499.
95

SPANGLER (FINAL EDIT)

2009]

1/28/2010 2:46 PM

COMMENT

1311

argued that common-law causes of action sufficiently protect moral
102
rights. This line of reasoning, however, is presumably an attempt by
Congress to avoid statutory moral-rights protection without violating
the Berne Convention. Arguing that these common-law doctrines safeguard moral rights proves to be an absurdity because moral rights
are in fact at odds with the economic interests these common-law
doctrines were created to protect. Put another way, moral rights did
not exist at common law, so it is nonsensical to argue they are protected by common-law causes of action.
A. Troubling Attempts to Protect Moral Rights Through Common-Law
Causes of Action
While common-law causes of action may protect the artist’s eco103
nomic rights, they do not protect the artist’s personal rights. These
personal rights can only be protected through moral-rights legisla104
tion. Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Cos., in which the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit attempted to use
trademark law to protect the authors’ moral rights, illustrates this
problem. In Gilliam, the writers of a television series brought suit
against American Broadcasting Company for airing episodes of their
series, which had been substantially edited, without the authors’
105
permission.
The authors argued that these edited versions misre106
The Second Circuit held that
presented their work to the public.
the integrity of the authors’ work, while not protected by U.S. law via
any moral-rights legislation, ought to be protected under the Lanham
107
Act:
American copyright law, as presently written, does not recognize
moral rights or provide a cause of action for their violation, since
the law seeks to vindicate the economic, rather than the personal,
rights of authors. Nevertheless, the economic incentive for artistic
and intellectual creation that serves as the foundation for American copyright law, cannot be reconciled with the inability of artists
to obtain relief for mutilation or misrepresentation of their work
to the public on which the artists are financially dependent. Thus
courts have long granted relief for misrepresentation of an artist’s

102

See supra text accompanying note 87.
Ong, supra note 10, passim.
104
538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976).
105
Id. at 17.
106
Id. at 19.
107
For a discussion of the Lanham Act’s arguable protection of moral rights, see
supra text accompanying notes 88–92.
103
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work by relying on theories outside the statutory law of copy108
right.

The court’s noble intent in Gilliam clearly recognized that art
contains interests worth protecting beyond economic interests. However, the court used inadequate means of protecting those interests.
It attempted to transform moral rights into something very similar to
109
what is already protected by copyright law. Legal doctrines such as
copyright, contract, and trademark protect economic rights; to say
that they also protect moral rights is to say that moral rights reduce to
economic rights, which they fundamentally do not. In essence, the
court morphed moral rights into economic rights and, in doing so,
rendered impotent the very non-economic interests that moral rights
aim to protect.
Professor Burton Ong made a similar argument in his article,
Why Moral Rights Matter: Recognizing the Intrinsic Value of Integrity
110
Rights.
Ong is not reacting to Gilliam, but rather to Henry Hansmann and Marina Santilli’s transposition of property law onto moral
111
rights.
However, Ong’s argument is akin to this concern with Gilliam-esque backdoor approaches to protecting moral rights because
Ong likewise argues that moral rights cannot be protected via any
economic doctrine—whether it be property law (as Hansmann and
112
Santilli propose) or trademark law (as in Gilliam).
Moral rights
should not be subjected to economic analysis, according to Ong, because doing so shifts the focus from moral rights’ “intrinsic value as
marks of respect for, and recognition of, the artistic contributions of
the artist”––things that cannot be accounted for in an economic
113
analysis.
Further, an economic analysis focuses on the artist’s pe114
cuniary interest, which is not the interest protected by moral rights.
The implications of using a Gilliam-type attempt at safeguarding
moral rights via laws that protect economic interests have been rea115
lized in at least one case, Choe v. Fordham University School of Law. In
Choe, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York
used Gilliam’s protection of the plaintiffs’ interests through the Lan108

Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 25–26 (citations omitted).
Ong, supra note 10, at 307.
110
Id. passim.
111
Hansmann & Santilli, supra note 83, at 101–02 (1997). See generally Ong, supra
note 10.
112
Ong, supra note 10, passim; see generally Hansmann & Santilli, supra note 83 (advocating for moral rights, but characterizing them as “divided property rights”).
113
Id. at 298.
114
See, e.g., id. passim.
115
Choe v. Fordham Univ. Sch. of Law, 920 F. Supp. 44 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
109
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ham Act, rather than through recognition of moral rights, to con116
clude that there are no moral rights in U.S. law. This is, ironically,
117
converse to the court’s intent in Gilliam, and such an application of
Gilliam is further evidence of the impossibility of protecting moral
rights via an economic analysis.
B. The Lack of U.S. Statutory Moral-Rights Protection Results
from Conflicts Between Moral Rights and Common-Law
Causes of Action
Because moral rights exist independently of economic rights,
the two naturally conflict on occasion. Resolving some of these conflicts requires choosing whether to give legal priority to either moral
rights or copyrights—to the detriment of the other. Congress’s refusal to formally recognize moral rights is likely driven by its preference for economic interests and thus its corresponding reluctance to
recognize rights that may trivialize these economic interests.
For example, moral rights may interfere with freedom of con118
119
tract in several ways.
First, moral rights are not waivable, which
limits parties’ freedom to negotiate moral-rights provisions into and
out of a contract. Second, moral rights abridge copyright licensing
agreements by establishing that the artist retains moral rights, regard120
less of what is purportedly transferred via a license. Finally, moral
rights excuse the artist from completing a commissioned work for
personal reasons, regardless of a contractual obligation to the con121
trary.
The moral-rights doctrine may also interfere with current U.S.
122
copyright law.
The moral right to resale profits, for example, not

116

Id. at 49 (“There is no federal claim for violation of plaintiff’s alleged ‘moral
rights.’ The Court in Gilliam stated that nearly 20 years ago.”).
117
See Gilliam v. Am. Broad. Cos., 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976).
118
See Rigamonti, supra note 20, at 374 (arguing that moral rights impose “a mandatory term on every contract containing a copyright license or an assignment of
specific economic rights . . . that authors are always entitled to rescind unilaterally
the contract”).
119
See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
120
See supra note 44 and accompanying text (stating that moral rights remain
vested in the artist even when the copyright is transferred).
121
See DUBOFF & KING, supra note 54, at 205. The seminal case prompting recognition of this right in France was Whistler v. Eden. Cour de cassation [Cass. 1e civ.]
[highest court of ordinary jurisdiction] Seine, Mar. 14, 1900, D.P. 1900, I, 497 (Fr.).
122
Hayes, supra note 86, at 1015 (“In order to successfully attach moral rights to
American law it would be necessary to effectuate significant change in the fundamental goals and philosophy of the federal copyright law.”).
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only conflicts with, but flies in the face of, the first sale doctrine.
The first sale doctrine establishes that the copyright owner’s right to a
124
particular copy of her work ends once that copy has first been sold.
The right to resale profits, in contrast, requires a royalty be paid to
125
the creator every time a copy of her work is sold—and resold.
In
addition, moral rights have the potential to restrict the use of a work
in the public domain, which is problematic because works in the pub126
lic domain are, by definition, unrestricted.
Finally, moral-rights
theory conflicts with the work-for-hire doctrine, which is an exception
127
to the general rule that the creator initially owns the copyright, because moral rights do not allow “works for hire,” in the sense that the
128
author cannot contract away her moral rights.
At least one U.S. federal circuit court has ruled that copyright
law preempts other means of protecting artistic works. In Laws v. So129
ny Music Entertainment, the plaintiff attempted to use the right of
publicity to obtain relief from her record company, which licensed
her song (in which the record company owned the copyright) for a
130
use of which she did not approve.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit held that the Copyright Act preempts the right of
publicity because to conclude otherwise would imply that “virtually
every use of a copyrighted sound recording would infringe upon the
131
original performer’s right of publicity.”
This ruling reinforces the

123

17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2006); see Desai, supra note 47, at 18.
17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (“[T]he owner of a particular copy or phonorecord lawfully
made under this title, or any person authorized by such owner, is entitled, without
the authority of the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of
that copy or phonorecord.”).
125
Liemer, supra note 12, at 55; see also supra text accompanying note 29.
126
Shostakovich v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 80 N.Y.S. 2d 575, 578 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1948).
127
17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining “work made for hire” as “(1) a work prepared by an
employee within the scope of his or her employment; or (2) a work specially ordered
or commissioned for use as a contribution to a collective work”).
128
Hayes, supra note 86, at 1027–31 (pointing out that moral rights potentially
conflict with the work-for-hire doctrine). The author usually cannot contract away
moral rights because they are not waivable. Liemer, supra note 12, at 44.
129
448 F.3d 1134 (9th Cir. 2006).
130
Id. at 1136.
131
Id. at 1145. Ironically, this is exactly the sort of implication that can be useful
in helping to discourage illegal music-file sharing. See infra Part IV.C (discussing the
need for a legally protected artists’ right that is infringed when the consumer downloads).
124
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notion that in the current U.S. legal regime an artist retains no rights
132
to her work once she has transferred its copyright.
In addition to conflicting with U.S. contract doctrine and copyright law, moral rights also conflict with the free alienability of property. In American law, property rights often take precedent over oth133
er rights, and moral rights are essentially a form of servitude
134
restricting the free alienability of intellectual property. In an article
titled Authors’ and Artists’ Moral Rights: A Comparative Legal and Economic Analysis, Hansmann and Santilli attempt to superimpose property
law onto moral rights by arguing that in U.S. law “a seller of chattel
generally cannot reserve rights in the chattel . . . that are enforceable
135
against subsequent purchasers.” Moral rights, Hansmann and Santilli theorize, attempt to change this rule for art by allowing the author to create a negative servitude in her work, in the form of prohi136
biting deformation or mutilation without the author’s permission.
In this way, moral rights lower the value of artwork as property by re137
stricting the way the artwork can be used and transferred.
Moral rights conflict with notions such as freedom of contract,
copyright, and free transferability of property. Because the United
States tends to favor protection of economic interests at (almost) all
costs, there is a national reluctance to recognize moral rights. However, it is unclear just why economic rights, and doctrines protecting
them, ought to be prioritized above other rights. Additionally, such a
prioritization can lead to unintended consequences, some of which
may in fact prove detrimental to the economic interest-holders.
IV. FOR THE LOVE OF MONEY: DRIVING FORCES BEHIND ILLEGAL
MUSIC-FILE SHARING AND MORAL RIGHTS AS AN ANTIDOTE
One unintended consequence of prioritizing economic rights in
artistic works has been a shift in society’s view of those works. Society
loses sight of the works’ non-economic value when only the economic
132

Robert Gerber, Copyright Act Preempts Singer's Right of Privacy and Publicity Claims
Under California Law, INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW BLOG, June 29, 2006,
http://www.intellectualpropertylawblog.com/archives/22883-print.html.
133
See FISHER, supra note 6, at 138; Ilhyung Lee, Toward an American Moral Rights in
Copyright, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 795, 814 (2001).
134
See JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN & ALBERT E. ELSEN, LAW, ETHICS AND THE VISUAL
ARTS 310 (4th ed. 2002); Hansmann & Santilli, supra note 83, at 101–02; Julie Levy,
Creative Works as Negotiable Instruments: A Compromise between Moral Rights Protection and
the Need for Transferability in the United States, 5 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 27, 29 (2003).
135
Hansmann & Santilli, supra note 83, at 101.
136
Id.
137
See id.
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value is protected by law, causing the works to be viewed as commodities rather than as art.
A. Major Labels’ Treatment of Music as a Marketable Commodity
Major labels view, treat, and market artists solely in terms of their
profit-making ability, reflecting their view of music as a commodity.
As Julie Levy writes, “in the United States, creative works are commodities that can be bought and sold. Copyrights give authors economic incentives to create but fail to recognize the final product as a
138
reflection of the authors’ personalities.” For the record label, “a hit
song is an annuity, earning money year after year for its lucky own139
er,” with its “lucky owner” almost always being the record company.
In viewing music as a commodity, major labels attempt to maximize
the profits derived from it, often at the expense of both the artist and
music fans.
One way major labels have maximized profits is through de140
creased payments to artists. Record contracts generally require artists to relinquish ownership of their sound recordings to the record
141
label; this is accomplished by transferring the works’ copyright.
Furthermore, artists realize only a very small fraction of the profits
from their albums, with the majority going to the label. On average,
the record label pays an artist a meager $1.43 for the sale of each
142
compact disc with a suggested retail price of nineteen dollars.
Another example of decreased payments to artists is several major labels’ continued deduction of “breakage” expenses from artists’ royalties, despite the fact that “breakage” refers to record albums made of
shellac, which have not been used in the industry for quite some
143
time.
As another method of reducing expenses, major labels have de144
creased the quality of the artists they sign and decreased time spent

138

Levy, supra note 134, at 27.
FREDRIC DANNEN, HIT MEN: POWER BROKERS AND FAST MONEY INSIDE THE MUSIC
BUSINESS 32 (1990).
140
See Gary Shapiro, Sell Don’t Sue, ISM SOUND NETWORK NEWS, Feb. 1, 2006,
http://www.ismsound.com/index/news/id.223.
141
E.g., Desai, supra note 46, at 18–19.
142
See TED LATHROP, THIS BUSINESS OF MUSIC MARKETING AND PROMOTION: A
PRACTICAL GUIDE TO CREATING A COMPLETELY INTEGRATED MARKETING AND EMARKETING CAMPAIGN 81 (rev. ed. 2003).
143
FISHER, supra note 6, at 158.
144
MAT CALLAHAN, THE TROUBLE WITH MUSIC 9 (2005) (commenting that music
was worth 51.7 cents per minute in 1992 and only fifteen cents per minute in 2002).
139
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145

on artist development.
Instead of treating music as the noncommodifiable art form that it is, major labels treat music as something manufacturable. Matt Callahan states that “a large quantity of
music is produced according to formulas, more or less rationally designed, and promoted for sale amongst the populace as a replace146
He
ment for that which organically arises from amongst them.”
calls this “Anti-Music” and characterizes it as “the sonic equivalent of
147
fast food.” Major labels have flooded the marketplace with this lowquality manufactured “music,” leaving music consumers “to more
readily consume the McMusic which can be more effectively con148
trolled and more profitably sold than the genuine article.”
In addition to reducing expenses, major labels have increased
149
costs to consumers. Average compact disc prices rose from ten dollars to fifteen dollars between 1995 and 2000, despite the fact that the
cost of producing a compact disc declined substantially during that
150
151
period; prices rose another 7.2% between 1999 and 2001.
This
price increase was substantial enough to warrant scrutiny by the Federal Trade Commission after thirty states filed suit against the major
152
labels for price fixing.
Major labels have also exploited consumers in their treatment of
music as a commodity by molding music fans into “markets.” Just as
lowering production costs and payments to artists exploits music and
musicians, attempting to capture as much of the consumers’ disposa153
ble income as possible exploits music fans.
As Ryan Mills writes,
145

See KUSEK & LEONHARD, supra note 7, at 108; Claire Matheson, Could EMI Become
NEWS,
May
22,
2007,
No.
1
Bid.
Target?,
BBC
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/6446255.stm (“[I]f consolidation continues,
companies will be firmly focused on the money and not the music––and that means
even less artist development and a lot more ‘one-hit wonders’.”).
146
CALLAHAN, supra note 144, at 23.
147
Id.
148
Id. at xx.
149
See Shapiro, supra note 140.
150
Too Much for Mozart, ST. LEGISLATURES, Dec. 2000, at 10, 10; U.S. States Sue Big
Music, CNNMONEY.COM, Aug. 8, 2000, http://money.cnn.com/2000/08/08/
companies/record_industry.
151
LESSIG, supra note 4, at 70.
152
U.S. States Sue Big Music, supra note 150. The states asserted that the price increase caused consumers to pay $480 million more than they should have between
1997 and 2000. Id. The labels later settled with the FTC. Michele Wilson-Morris,
Five Major Labels Settle with the FTC over Retailer CD Pricing, MUSICDISH, May 11, 2000,
http://musicdish.com/mag/?id=974.
153
See KUSEK & LEONHARD, supra note 7, at 30 (“[T]he music industry has had the
amazing luxury of earning billions of dollars every year, despite the fact that the consumer has had to constantly sacrifice some essential needs and desires, simply to get
any music at all.”).
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“music [is] no longer about the music; it [is] about grabbing the attention of the distracted listener and thus drawing a profit from them
154
This treatment of music audiences as markets is “the de[sic].”
struction of an organic, uncommodifiable relationship between
people and their creative expressions, and the construction of an ex155
ploitative one in its place.”
Finally, major labels also attempt to maximize profits by forcing
others out of the market. There were only three “major labels” as of
156
2008, and each had its own distributors. Large conglomerates also
have a heavy hand in the radio and retail sectors of the music industry. Until recently, one such conglomerate, Clear Channel Communications, owned a majority of U.S. major radio stations and many live
157
music venues. Additionally, in 2002–2004, “big box” stores, such as
Wal-Mart, sold more recorded music than traditional record stores,
158
and Wal-Mart was the top music retailer of 2007. This results in the
manufacture, distribution, and sale of music largely by huge, profitdriven conglomerates, rather than boutique, music-driven compa159
nies.
B. Major Labels’ Commodification of Music Created an Environment
Conducive to Illegal Music-File-Sharing
To many consumers there is a special quality of art that makes a
fifteen-dollar pile of bricks, for example, inherently less valuable than
160
a fifteen-dollar music compact disc. As Rajan Desai writes, “[m]usic
154

Ryan Mills, Contemporary Music (Feb. 20, 2005) (unpublished paper), available at http://tonalatonal.blogspot.com/2005_02_01_archive.html.
155
CALLAHAN, supra note 144, at 27.
156
See DANNEN, supra note 139, at 111–12 (explaining that what makes a label “major” is that it does its own nationwide distribution).
157
See, e.g., Frank Ahrens, Clear Channel Sale to End Era, WASH. POST, Nov. 17, 2006,
at D01 (characterizing Clear Channel as “a giant that dominated the industry and
became the bogyman of media consolidation for the past half-decade”).
158
Record stores accounted for 36.8%, 33.2%, and 32.5% of recorded music sales
in 2002, 2003, and 2004, respectively; “other” stores accounted for 50.7%, 52.8%, and
53.8% of recorded music sales in 2002, 2003, and 2004, respectively. Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am., 2006 Consumer Profile, http://76.74.24.142/E795D602-FA503F5A-3730-9C8A40B98C46.pdf. In 2006, record stores accounted for 35.4% of recorded music sales, and “other” stores accounted for 32.7% of recorded music sales.
Id. Wal-Mart was the number one music retailer of 2007. Steve Knopper, Wal-Mart
Demands CD-Price Cut, ROLLING STONE, Apr. 3, 2008, at 16.
159
See KUSEK & LEONHARD, supra note 7, at 109. This is exemplified in the fact that
“[Wal-Mart] is powerful enough that it can bypass the record industry entirely, as it
did with the Eagles’ Long Road Out of Eden, which sold 2.6 million copies exclusively
through Wal-Mart.” Knopper, supra note 158, at 16.
160
It is this “special quality” that moral rights seek to protect.
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161

has a purpose and a meaning greater than economic concerns.”
Art is not necessarily intended to be profitable, and when a supplier
commodifies it, it does not necessarily work the way a widget would in
162
163
the marketplace.
Music cannot be mass-produced in a factory.
Sarah Zimmerman writes that “anytime you take something that is
precious to you [like music] and commodify it, it’ll eventually come
164
back to hurt you.” In this case, treatment of music as a commodity
“came back to hurt” major labels by causing consumers to likewise
view music as a commodity.
At some point, major labels raised their prices too high and lowered their quality too far, forcing consumers to look for alternate
channels of music distribution. It is at this point that Napster and
165
similar services entered the market and filled this consumer need.
As Callahan writes: “What downloading has done is to expose the inequities inherent in the current system of music distribution. It has
laid bare the way the music industry has functioned since recorded
166
music became a profitable commodity.” This is similar to what occurred in the travel industry with the birth of online travel agents,
such as Expedia and Orbitz. Airlines and hotels were forced to lower
167
their prices and strengthen their quality standards in order to com161

Desai, supra note 46, at 3.
See GEORGE W.F. HEGEL, HEGEL’S PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 40–41 (T.M. Knox
trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1949) (1821) (arguing that works of art may not be
“things” because “while possession of these may be the subject of business dealings
and contracts, as if they were things, there is also something inward and mental”
about them); Hughes, supra note 9, at 315 (highlighting differences between ideas
and physical property).
163
This relates back to Callahan’s characterization of mass-produced “McMusic”
as something distinct from genuine “music.” CALLAHAN, supra note 144, at xx.
164
Sarah Zimmerman, Jaded at Ten, MAXIMUM ROCKNROLL, June 1994, available at
http://www.arancidamoeba.com/mrr/sarahcol.html.
165
See David W. Opderbeck, Peer-to-Peer Networks, Technological Evolution, and Intellectual Property Reverse Private Attorney General Litigation, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1685,
1713 (“A successful P2P project allows tens of millions of users to subvert what is perceived as an unjust institution––the content industry’s control over distribution of
creative works . . . .”).
166
CALLAHAN, supra note 144, at 226.
167
Jeff Higley, Technology Talk Grips Las Vegas Show: Internet’s Impact on Industry
Turns into Focal Point at June Conference, 217 HOTEL & MOTEL MANAGEMENT 6 (2002)
(on file with author) (illustrating that Internet reservations have increased, and rates
have decreased, with one hotel chain reporting Internet rates down forty percent);
Jeremy A. Verlinda & Leonard Lane, The Effect of Internet on Pricing in the Airline
Industry 2 (Nov. 2004) (unpublished paper, on file with author) (noting that air travel prices become more competitive “as the size of the Internet airline travel search
population grows”); Carmina Perez, E-Travel Site Takes Off, CNNMONEY.COM, May 25,
2001, http://money.cnn.com/2001/05/25/living/q_orbitz/index.htm (“Orbitz
could force airlines to lower fares in the immediate future . . . .”).
162
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pete with these new market entrants. As a result, revenue from leisure travel in the United States increased from $400 million in 1997
168
to $15.4 billion in 2000. The record industry ought to use this as a
model of successful competition with new technologies, rather than
continuing to fight against them. In recent years, where the travel
industry has lowered prices and increased quality, the record industry
169
170
has increased prices and decreased quality. It is thus no wonder
the record industry has witnessed the opposite result of the travel industry in battling competition from online distributors—record sales
171
172
have plummeted, while travel sales have skyrocketed.
In maximizing music profits, major labels exploited artists and
consumers by lowering quality and raising prices, while decreasing
payments to artists. In blunt terms, major labels have been “stealing”
173
from artists and consumers for decades, creating a sort of “eye for
an eye” mentality in the minds of many music consumers. Consumers felt, and continue to feel, that music is priced too high. This in
turn caused consumers to become resentful toward major labels,
which further increased demand for networks such as Napster by removing some of the guilt the consumer would normally feel for theft.
In short, “[t]o much of the American public, the recording industry
is greedy and rapacious. It is hard for many Americans to feel guilty
about ‘stealing’ music by downloading free MP3s when they consider
the recording industry to have been stealing from its artists for dec174
ades.”
This sentiment leads to resentment toward the industry and
175
makes downloading more attractive.
Even consumers who oppose
illegal downloading find trouble mustering sympathy for the record
176
industry. According to the recording artist Prince, the rise of illegal
music-file sharing has “little [to] do with people’s intrinsic respect
[for] art and artists, and everything [to] do with the cynical attitude
168

OFFICE OF ADVOCACY, U.S. SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, E-COMMERCE’S
IMPACT ON THE TRAVEL AGENCY INDUSTRY 6 (2001), available at
http://www.sba.gov/advo/research/rs210tot.pdf.
169
See supra notes 149–51 and accompanying text.
170
See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
171
See, e.g., supra note 4 and accompanying text.
172
See, e.g., supra note 168 and accompanying text.
173
“Stealing” here refers to lowering payments to the artists whose products they
are selling and increasing prices to the consumers who are purchasing the products.
See supra notes 140–43, 149–52 and accompanying text.
174
Stacey M. Lantagne, Note, The Morality of MP3s: The Failure of the Recording Industry’s Plan of Attack, 18 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 269, 280 (2004).
175
KUSEK & LEONHARD, supra note 7, at 32; Lantagne, supra note 174, at 279.
176
Lantagne, supra note 174, at 281.
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of big industry conglomerates, which have consistently pushed [for]
more and more commercial, highly profitable products at the
177
[e]xpense of authentic art and respect [for] artists.” Because consumers do not sympathize with record labels, they feel less guilt for
obtaining record labels’ products without paying for them.
Moreover, sharing music files without permission is currently illegal as copyright infringement. An attempt to make P2P users feel
guilty for copyright infringement is essentially a moral appeal. This
appeal will fail for at least two reasons. First, copyright is inherently
178
“amoral.”
One author postulates that copyright is, in fact, amoral
179
precisely because it ignores moral rights. Simply put, many Ameri180
cans see copyright as a money issue and not a moral issue. To many
181
young P2P users, illegally sharing music files is “harmless fun,” akin
to sneaking into a movie or reading a magazine in a bookstore coffee
lounge and then placing it back on the shelf. Second, consumers by
and large simply do not sympathize with record labels, thus making
182
consumers less likely to view stealing from record labels as immoral.
In 2000, a poll revealed that forty to fifty-six percent of all respondents felt it was not immoral to download music without paying for
183
it. In addition, a 2003 survey indicated that three out of four teens
feel it should be legal to share music files without paying the rights184
holder.
The Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) and
185
other interested parties compare file sharing to stealing a compact
177

CALLAHAN, supra note 144, at 214.
Russell J. DaSilva, Droit Moral and the Amoral Copyright: A Comparison of Artists’
Rights in France and the United States, 28 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 1 passim (1980)
(copyright is amoral); see Lantagne, supra note 174, at 282–83 (stating that a moral
appeal to stop copyright infringement will fail).
179
DaSilva, supra note 178, at 6.
180
See Lantagne, supra note 174, at 283.
181
KUSEK & LEONHARD, supra note 7, at 101.
182
See FISHER, supra note 6, at 124 (noting that as of 2003, sixty-seven percent of
downloaders did not care whether the music they were downloading was copyrighted; this percentage was higher than ever before); Lantagne, supra note 174, at
278–83.
183
FISHER, supra note 6, at 3; see also Lantagne, supra note 174, at 282 (indicating
that “most people do not think it is immoral [to download MP3s] independent of
copyright law”).
184
KUSEK & LEONHARD, supra note 7, at 101. Note that this does not indicate
whether or not teens feel they ought to pay the artist.
185
Congressman Howard Berman, Speech to the Computer & Communications
Industry Association Regarding Solutions to Peer to Peer Piracy (July 25, 2002),
available
at
http://www.house.gov/list/press/ca28_berman/ComputerCommunicationsIndustry
Assosiation.shtml (“There is no difference between pocketing a CD in a Tower
178
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disc, but frankly, American music consumers just do not buy it (liter186
First, many consumers download songs that they would not
ally).
otherwise pay for; second, there is the notion that when a compact
disc is stolen from a store, that store has one less disc to sell—the
187
same is not true with digital music files. Many consumers simply do
not liken P2P music-file sharing to shoplifting. This, along with the
absence of sympathy for record labels, amplifies the lack of guilt consumers feel for engaging in the activity, thus making illegal downloading more attractive and increasingly popular.
C. Moral-Rights Protection as a Remedy
Moral-rights protection can help undo the harmful side effects
that have resulted from major labels’ commodification of music, including causing consumers to lose sight of the value of music and refrain from feeling guilty for illegally downloading music. Commodification of music causes both the record label and the consumer to
188
lose sight of that je ne sais quoi in music that makes it something
more than a disposable good. It is this same je ne sais quoi that moral
rights seek to protect. As a result, enacting moral-rights legislation
can help restore the value placed on music and help consumers decide once again that it is worth paying for. Moral rights can
accomplish this, in part, by bolstering respect for art and artists.
A society’s laws protecting art reflect the value (or lack thereof)
189
placed on art by that society. Consequently, a society with laws that
protect only art’s economic interests teaches its members that only
the monetary value derived from art is worth protecting. Moral rights
can create a social respect for art because they demonstrate that society views the non-economic value of art as important enough to
190
This social respect for art cultivated by
warrant legal protection.
moral rights can in turn help de-commodify music, which can make
illegally downloading it less attractive.
Records and downloading copyrighted songs. . . . Theft is theft.”). Notably, Congressman Berman represents California’s Twenty-Eighth District, home to many major labels’ West Coast headquarters.
186
Lantagne, supra note 174, at 278.
187
LESSIG, supra note 4, at 70–71 (citing Jane Black, Big Music’s Broken Record,
BUSINESSWEEK ONLINE, Feb. 13, 2003, http://www.businessweek.com/technology/
content/feb2003/tc20030213_9095_tc078.htm).
188
Translated from the French for “I do not know what” and meaning, roughly,
“that little something; a quality that eludes description.” NEW DICTIONARY OF
CULTURAL LITERACY 70 (3d ed. 2002), available at http://www.bartleby.com/cgibin/texis/webinator/sitesearch?query=je+ne+sais+quoi&filter=col59&Submit=Go.
189
See Liemer, supra note 12, at 41.
190
See Ong, supra note 10, at 311–12.
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In addition to creating respect for art, moral rights can create
191
social respect for artists. As Russell DaSilva writes: “[T]he failure of
the federal copyright law even to address the issue [of moral rights]
192
creates a national standard of indifference toward artists’ rights.”
Moral-rights legislation would help make the United States an envi193
The
ronment in which contributions of the artist are recognized.
current lack of moral-rights protection in the United States creates
the perverse situation in which the owner of the art’s copyright is pro194
tected under the law, while the actual creator of the art is not. The
current regime, therefore, not only gives preference to copyrights
195
over moral rights, but also to content owners over creators. Garnering respect for art and artists can help de-commodify music by increasing the value placed on it and thus making it something consumers are more ready to pay for and less likely to steal.
Moral rights can also create more consumer guilt for illegal music-file sharing by creating a second victim of illegal downloading—
the artist. While consumers tend not to sympathize with major
record labels, many downloaders would gladly pay for an album if the
196
proceeds went directly to the artist.
However, consumers “are becoming aware that the record companies want them to pay somewhere between six to fifteen times what the artist makes from the sale
197
of the [compact disc].”
The RIAA’s widely publicized lawsuits

191

See Holst, supra note 56, at 114.
DaSilva, supra note 178, at 6.
193
Ong, supra note 10, at 302.
194
This is assuming the creator and the copyright owner are not the same person,
which they usually are not. See supra notes 45–47 and accompanying text.
195
See DaSilva, supra note 178, at 54.
196
See Lantagne, supra note 174, at 280. This postulation finds support in the recent success of Radiohead’s album, In Rainbows, which the band initially made available only as a download and allowed downloaders to name their own price. Paul
Sexton, Back to the Future, BILLBOARD, Jan. 12, 2008, at 27. While the band has not released official U.S. sales figures as of the writing of this Comment, the average price
paid for the download is estimated at between eight and nine dollars. Id. Even
sources estimating more modest prices of two or three dollars acknowledge that this
is nonetheless more than the band would have been paid as a royalty on a regularlypriced compact disc from its record label. Sheila Marikar, Radiohead Lets Fans Set CD
Price, ABC NEWS, Nov. 6, 2007, http://abcnews.go.com/Entertainment/
story?id=3826638&page=1. Musical group Nine Inch Nails has also reaped the benefits of the Radiohead model; Nine Inch Nails’ 2008 album, Ghosts I-IV, was only available for purchase from the artist’s own Web site and took in $1.6 million in sales its
first week. NIN Scores with Web Release, ROLLING STONE, Apr. 3, 2008, at 16.
197
KUSEK & LEONHARD, supra note 7, at 32.
192
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198

against music downloaders have ironically reiterated this fact to
199
Consumers see that it is the record labels—and not the
consumers.
artists—suing for downloading, which implies that it is the record labels’ interests they are infringing, and not the artists’, when they use
P2P networks.
Moral-rights legislation, in contrast to copyright law, can help
consumers frame illegal music-file sharing as stealing from the artist
(and not merely the record label) by creating a legal right for artists
that is infringed when music is illegally downloaded, even if the artist
no longer owns the copyright. What is more, moral rights can help
consumers see that they are stealing more than money when they
download songs without permission; each song contains a piece of
the artist himself.
Although adopting moral-rights protection into U.S. law would
make it illegal to violate moral rights, it is not the fear of additional
punishment that will discourage consumers from using P2P networks
to share music. Instead, moral rights will help educate consumers
that when they do so they are diverting income from a “starving artist,” which will help create sympathy that can discourage consumers
from downloading. Legally recognized moral rights will not help
curb P2P music-file sharing by providing another cause of action by
which to punish it but rather will make a statement about the value of
art. In this way, moral rights can help to change consumer norms regarding the value of music.
V. TEACHING AN OLD DOG NEW TRICKS: CONVINCING CONTENT
OWNERS THAT MORAL-RIGHTS PROTECTION IS NECESSARY
The recorded music industry would likely initially oppose moralrights legislation because moral rights would limit the economic val200
ue of copyrights by restricting their use and alienability. Additionally, moral rights would increase record labels’ expenses in the form
of time spent securing permission from the creator each time the label wanted to exploit the work. This decrease in economic value and
198

See, e.g., Capitol Records, Inc. v. Foster, No. Civ. 04-1569-W, 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 33227 (W.D. Okla. Apr. 23, 2007); Priority Records LLC v. Chan, No. 04-CV73645-DT, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20360 (E.D. Mich. May 19, 2005).
199
The suits have also caused a tremendous loss in the consumer’s trust of the
record labels. KUSEK & LEONHARD, supra note 7, at 147. Additionally, the suits have
ironically provided valuable public relations for file sharing technology. Opderbeck,
supra note 165, at 1721.
200
Ironically, this desire to maximize economic potential is one of the very reasons consumers do not feel guilty about stealing from record labels via file sharing.
See supra Part IV.
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increase in expenses would essentially result in increased transaction
costs to the content owners, making the content owners unlikely to
support moral-rights legislation.
A. Benefits to Content Owners Will Outweigh Corresponding Decreases
in the Value of Copyrights
Historical opposition to moral-rights legislation has in fact come
most prominently from movie studios, record labels, publishers, and
201
the like ––the copyright owners. During 1936 congressional hearings, major film producers argued against the United States joining
202
the Berne Convention because of its moral-rights provision. A representative at those hearings from Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corporation argued:
Our chief objection, as I said, is to the moral clause. That is of
great concern to the motion-picture industry; we must have a
right to change an author’s work. . . . A motion picture is intended to have entertainment value for the great masses and its
financial success depends upon its mass-psychology entertainment
203
value; the wider the appeal, the greater its value.

Major record labels would likely endorse this argument as well because, like film studios, they are in the business of exploiting content
to its maximum commercial potential.
Moral-rights protection would limit the use of copyrighted material by preventing anyone other than the creator from changing the
204
art in certain ways.
This, in turn, could prevent changes which
205
would make the art more economically viable, thus lowering the
value of the copyright. Moral rights would also limit the free aliena201

See Lee, supra note 133, at 804–05; David W. Opderbeck, The Penguin’s Paradox:
The Political Economy of International Intellectual Property and the Paradox of Open Intellectual Property Models, 18 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 101, 103 (2007) (“The standard narrative is that large corporate interests, such as . . . the entertainment industry, have
been able to capture the lawmaking process such that the law has increasingly come
to favor stronger intellectual property protection.”); Roeder, supra note 30, at 558;
Holst, supra note 56, at 112 (quoting Peter Jaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphoses of Authorship, 1991 DUKE L.J. 455, 497).
202
Berne Convention, supra note 78, art. 6bis.; Hearings Before the H. Comm. on Patents, 74th Cong. 1011–13 (1936) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Edwin P. Kilroe, attorney for Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. and Movietonews, Inc.).
203
Hearings, supra note 202, at 1012.
204
See supra notes 24–26 and accompanying text (stating that the moral right of
integrity prevents alteration of the work by anyone other than the creator); supra
notes 133–37 and accompanying text (stating that moral rights interfere with the free
alienability of property).
205
For example, remastering a recording, converting a recording into a new medium, etc.
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bility of artistic works by placing servitudes on them. Content owners are likely to argue that if creative works cannot be transferred
207
freely, they are of little value in the United States.
Several problems inherently exist in this argument. First, to say
artistic works are of “little value” if they cannot be traded freely is to
say they are of “less economic value”; this argument is flawed in that it
views art as only having value in economic terms. Second, the file
sharing problem is essentially music being traded too freely, so restraints on this literally “free” trade of music may not be harmful toward copyright owners after all. In fact, the entertainment “industry
tends to favor strong intellectual property rules, even if such rules be208
come a sort of trade barrier.” In this sense, moral rights are a necessary barrier against illegal trade via P2P networks.
Furthermore, this argument is fatally shortsighted. The record
industry is notorious for fighting new technologies, losing the battle,
209
and then blaming the new technologies for losses in sales. Arguing
against moral rights because of increased transaction costs would essentially become another instance of resisting new technology. These
shortsighted approaches have not worked well for the record industry
in the past, and it is highly unlikely such an approach is going to work
in staving off illegal P2P music-file sharing. Rather than resisting new
210
technologies, the record industry must learn to exploit them. One
crucial step in this lesson is realizing that the value of moral rights as
vehicles for shifting consumer norms away from illegal music-file
sharing outweigh the increased transaction costs due to moral rights.
While it is true that moral-rights protection would decrease the
economic value of copyrights, it would also help decrease illegal file
sharing. Over the long run, the increased transaction costs created
by moral rights would likely be less than labels’ losses due to file sharing. File sharing, although only popularly used to share music since
211
1999, has resulted in crippling losses to the music industry. Major

206

See supra notes 133–37 and accompanying text.
See generally Hansmann & Santilli, supra note 83 (focusing on the effects moral
rights may or may not have on a work of art’s economic value).
208
Opderbeck, supra note 201, at 133.
209
LESSIG, supra note 4, at 69.
210
See id. at 73.
211
See Norbert J. Michel, The Impact of Digital File Sharing on the Music Industry: An
Empirical Analysis, 6 TOPICS IN ECON. ANALYSIS & POL’Y 1, 11 (2006) (“Our micro-level
data test results suggest that file sharing may have reduced album sales (between
1999 and 2003) by as much as thirteen percent for some music consumers.”); INT’L
FED’N OF THE PHONOGRAPHIC INDUS., THE RECORDING INDUSTRY 2006 PIRACY REPORT:
PROTECTING CREATIVITY IN MUSIC 4 (2006), http://www.ifpi.org/content/library/
207
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labels are now forced to compete with P2P networks that distribute
their product for free. Landes and Posner postulate that “[s]triking
the correct balance between access and incentives is the central prob212
lem in copyright law.” P2P networks increase consumer access exponentially—to such an extent that incentives to create are threatened because record labels and artists receive no payment for their
product when it is obtained via an illegal P2P network. In order to
achieve Posner’s balance, access to music must be limited to preserve
incentives to create it. Moral rights can help limit access by discouraging consumers from sharing music files illegally. Accordingly, major labels’ interest in decreasing illegal music-file sharing should outweigh their interest in preventing restrictions on the free alienability
of copyrights. Freely alienable copyrights will be of no use to major
labels if those copyrights become worthless due to an epidemic of il213
legal file sharing.
B. Here We Are Now, Entertain Us: Innovations in Technology
Require New Safeguards for Artistic Works
214

Digital distribution is a “unique test of the copyright system.”
While the record industry has faced piracy since its inception, “pira215
cy” no longer means a few copies of a dubbed cassette tape. Works
can now be copied with digital code and then distributed to the pub216
lic on a widespread scale in new digital formats.
M-PEG Audio

piracy-report2006.pdf (estimating that almost twenty-billion songs were illegally
downloaded worldwide in 2005).
212
William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law,
18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 326 (1989).
213
See KUSEK & LEONHARD, supra note 7, at 32 (urging that the music industry must
put the needs of artists and consumers before “existing incumbents’ business interests” if it is to survive).
214
See LERNER & BRESLER, supra note 38, at 1994; Note, Visual Artists’ Rights in a Digital Age, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1977, 1978 (1994).
215
See FISHER, supra note 6, at 110; Darcie-Nicole Wicknick, The RIAA Music Downloading Controversy: Both Sides of the Record, MUSICBIZADVICE.COM, Oct. 17, 2007,
http://www.musicbizadvice.com/a_little_history_on_music_piracy%20.htm.
Before the invention of blank tape it was close to impossible to COPY a
record. . . . Even after the invention of blank tape . . . copying a record
was a clunky process at best, involving a reel-to-reel machine . . . .
[When the cassette tape was invented], people began dubbing vinyl-tocassette and cassette-to-cassette, but chances were low that they were
selling them . . . . Dubbing was mostly kids at home who made mix
tapes . . . .
Id.
216
Wicknick, supra note 215.

SPANGLER (FINAL EDIT)

1328

1/28/2010 2:46 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:1299
217

Layer 3 (MP3), one such format, was invented in 1996, and by 1999,
218
“MP3” had become the most searched-for term on the Internet.
Additionally, the advent of P2P music-file sharing “drove demand for
219
access to the Internet more powerfully than any other application.”
Some scholars believe that the U.S. copyright system, as originally
220
conceived, simply cannot handle digital technologies. This necessitates looking outside the copyright system for new forms of protect221
ing artistic works—moral rights are one such “new form.”
The law cannot keep up with increasing technology via copyright
222
infringement lawsuits. The RIAA’s attempt to stop illegal file shar223
ing via these sorts of lawsuits has failed miserably. In fact, sales of
recorded music continue to decline, despite the passing of nearly a
decade since the RIAA won its legendary court battle to disarm Nap224
ster.
Sales of compact discs decreased nineteen percent in 2007,
225
and digital sales leveled off that year.
In addition, 2007 saw the

217

Mary
Bellis,
The
History
of
MP3,
ABOUT.COM:INVENTORS,
http://inventors.about.com/od/mstartinventions/a/MPThree.htm (“invented” referring to date U.S. patent issued for MP3 format).
218
MENN, supra note 1, at 110.
219
LESSIG, supra note 4, at 296.
220
Visual Artists’ Rights, supra note 214.
221
In addition to combating illegal digital distribution, the industry must also
learn to use digital distribution to its advantage, as iTunes and Amazon.com have recently begun to do by launching their respective online MP3 storefronts.
222
See FISHER, supra note 6, at 4 (commenting that record companies have been
less successful at fighting off recent technologies than they were in shutting down
Napster); KUSEK & LEONHARD, supra note 7, at 147.
223
For example, Capitol Records sued an alleged music downloader for copyright
infringement; the court rejected Capitol Records’ Motion for Reconsideration after
the lower court found the record label’s copyright infringement claims “untested
and marginal.” Capitol Records, Inc. v. Foster, No. Civ. 04-1569-W, 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 33227, at *5 (W.D. Okla. Apr. 23, 2007). In another such failed suit, Priority
Records voluntarily dismissed its suit against an alleged music downloader because of
issues regarding which member of the household was responsible for the downloading. Priority Records LLC v. Chan, No. 04-CV-73645-DT, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
20360, at *3, *7 (E.D. Mich. May 19, 2005). Circuit courts have refused to enforce
RIAA subpoenas requiring Internet service providers to reveal the names of customers the RIAA believes to be copyright infringers. Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am. v.
Charter Commc’ns, Inc., 393 F.3d 771 (8th Cir. 2004); Recording Indus. Ass’n of
Am. v. Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 359 U.S. App. D.C. 85 (D.C. Cir. 2003). Contra
Virgin Records Am., Inc. v. Thomas, No. 0:2006cv01497 (D. Minn. filed Apr. 19,
2006) (awarding jury verdict in favor of RIAA for $220,000). See FISHER, supra note 6,
at 3 (considering the possibility that consumers know downloading music is illegal
and continue to engage in it anyhow). See generally Lantagne, supra note 174.
224
See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
225
Steve Knopper, Major Labels Drop the Ax, ROLLING STONE, Dec. 27, 2007, at 15.
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worst sales week in Nielsen SoundScan history. Technology is everadvancing, which means that the United States legislature and the
content owners cannot afford to be sparing with rights for artistic
227
works.
Each time the courts enjoin one generation of file-sharing
systems, a new generation crops up, avoiding the legal issue that re228
sulted in the injunction of the previous system.
Any attempt by the music industry to limit illegal file sharing
must take into account the fact that the Internet has morphed Amer229
ican values. The generation currently coming of age has grown up
thinking that everything on the Internet is free, and “the music industry must convince this generation that music is not one of the In230
ternet’s ‘free goodies.’”
There are now teenagers entering adulthood who have never purchased a single compact disc and obtain all
231
of their music for “free” via illegal file sharing. In a 2007 consumer
survey that asked young people about the last compact disc they purchased, popular answers included variations of: “I don’t remember . .
232
. I burn my music for free.” This is especially problematic because
226

The Worst Week Ever, ROLLING STONE, Dec. 27, 2007, at 82 (indicating that the
week of Sept. 7, 2007 was the worst in Nielsen SoundScan history).
227
See Liemer, supra note 12, at 56–57; McCartney, supra note 25, at 72.
228
For example, Scour and Aimster arose after Napster. FISHER, supra note 6, at
112. When content holders were victorious against them in court, Gnutella arose. Id.
at 120. Next came Limewire and Bearshare. Id. at 121. KaZaA and Morpheus developed after these. Id.; see also Opderbeck, supra note 165, at 1689–90 (“As the
RIAA’s tactics have changed, P2P technology has kept pace.”).
229
See Lantagne, supra note 174, at 290.
230
Id. at 291. This is further complicated by the fact that some content on the Internet is legally available for free (YouTube, Pandora Radio, etc.). This inconsistency
not only confuses consumers but weakens the argument that content available online
is worth paying for.
231
See Scott Brown, Digital Rights Management—Go, No Go, or Just Behind the Curtain?, VIDEO INSIDER , June 4, 2007, http://www.mediapost.com/publications/
?fa=Articles.showArticle&art_aid=61417 (“Today we have at least two generations that
have used PCs and widely available ripping software to copy and in some cases distribute music entertainment. . . . [T]here are teens and young adults out there who
have never purchased a CD . . . .”); Shane Cartmill, RIAA Ruins Lives of 531 More Music Fans, MUSIC FOR LIFE, Feb. 17, 2004, http://homepage.mac.com/scartmill/iblog/
C1469494906/E657060254/index.html (“There is a generation of people out there
who have never purchased a CD in their lives. They are not going to buy worthless
music at inflated prices.”).
232
Posting of they to Survey Central, What Was the Last CD You Bought?,
http://surveycentral.org/survey/26051.html (Jan. 8, 2007 08:06 EST). Other answers included “[i]t’s been soooo [sic] long,” “I don’t think I have ever purchased a
CD,” “I have downloaded some,” “I stopped buying CDs because they rip you off with
prices when I can download them for free online,” “Too long ago,” “What’s a CD??,”
“I rarely purchase cds [sic],” “I prefer to burn my own, rather than spend 16-20 dollars for something that I’m only going to listen to maybe once or twice,” “I don’t
purchase CDs,” and “It’s been so long, I don’t remember.” Id.
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the generation that has grown up with the Internet is the same age
233
demographic that has traditionally driven the record business.
In order to combat illegal music-file-sharing, it is necessary to
counteract this shift in values by changing consumer norms, particularly among the generation coming of age after the advent of the Internet. In order to urge consumers that they steal from artists when
they use P2P networks to obtain music illegally, legally recognized artists’ rights must exist that are infringed when consumers illegally
download. Moral rights can provide this legally protected right for
the artist.
VI. DYLAN’S GONE ELECTRIC: CONCLUSION, BUY IN OR CASH OUT
Who’s going to throw that minstrel boy a coin? Who’s going to let it roll?
Who’s going to throw that minstrel boy a coin? Who’s going to let it save
his soul?
—Bob Dylan, “Minstrel Boy”

The music industry will need to adapt if it is to survive into the
Digital Age. This adaptation must involve some sacrifice, including
willingness to limit the free alienability of copyrights and to lobby for
moral-rights legislation. Moral rights will help to change the way
young people view music. Rather than depicting music as a disposable commodity, introducing moral rights will help young people to
realize the artistic and cultural value of music and to understand that
when they use P2P software for music-file sharing, they are not only
stealing from the record label but also from the artist.
Record labels are susceptible to losing artists, in addition to consumers, to digital distribution. Just as the Internet makes it easier for
consumers to obtain music without the record label, it makes it easier
for artists to distribute and market their music without the record la234
bel.
To prevent this, record labels must repair their relationships
with artists and consumers. For decades, record labels have caused a
disparity between themselves and artists by exploiting artists to maximize profits. Consumers have sided with artists, and in order to help
win consumers back, record labels must bridge this gap by showing
their support of artists; rallying for moral-rights legislation is one way
of doing so.
233

KUSEK & LEONHARD, supra note 7, at 100.
For example, well known artists such as the Smashing Pumpkins, the Eagles,
and the Black Crowes have begun releasing albums on their own, without working
with a record label. Evan Serpick, NIN, Eagles, Pumpkins: Who Needs Labels?, ROLLING
STONE, Apr. 17, 2008, at 11 (further noting that “thanks to digital distribution . . . the
labels are less necessary than ever”).
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This Comment does not intend to suggest that using P2P networks to download music illegally would disappear overnight upon
the enactment of moral-rights legislation. Instead, it urges that the
copyright system alone is not enough to eliminate this practice. It is
also necessary to change the way in which music is viewed and to increase the value that is placed on it by American society. The United
States has traditionally chosen to favor economic interests; this has
resulted in stronger copyright protection, at the expense of moralrights protection. A societal shift in the view of music, from an art
form to a disposable commodity, has been an unintended consequence of favoring economic interests. This view of music as a commodity, coupled with advancing technology allowing new channels of
music distribution, has called into question the way the music industry has traditionally functioned. Enacting moral-rights legislation
would emphasize that music is more than just a marketable commodity and that the musician, and not just the record label, has a personal stake in each song he creates. This sort of message would over
time help to create a social environment that has a greater respect for
music and is thus more willing to pay for it and less likely to steal it.
Finally, it should be noted that moral-rights legislation (and
more broadly increased social respect for art and artists) is just one
piece in the puzzle that is the survival of the record industry into the
Internet Age. Moral-rights legislation can help decrease illegal digital
distribution of music, but record labels must also learn to create legal
digital music distribution networks. It is imperative that record labels
take other steps as well, such as lowering prices and offering consumers the increased convenience they get from digital (versus physical)
distribution. Such steps, when coupled with moral-rights legislation,
will help to link the shift in consumer norms effectuated by moral
rights with an actual shift in consumer economic behavior, in the
form of decreased illegal music-file-sharing. P2P file sharing allows
consumers to obtain the same content in a more convenient and less
expensive venue than the compact disc format offered by major la235
bels. Major labels must learn to use digital distribution to their advantage, thus matching the convenience offered by P2P; in essence,
major labels must “find a way to protect artists while enabling this
236
[file] sharing to survive.”
When major labels match the conveni235

It should be noted that some record labels have begun offering content online,
via legal venues such as Apple’s iTunes Store; however, compact discs remain the
mainstay. See, e.g., Ethan Smith & Nick Wingfield, More Artists Steer Clear of iTunes,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 28, 2008, at B1.
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LESSIG, supra note 4, at 66.
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ence offered by P2P networks, all that is left is the price point, and
moral rights, in illuminating the artist’s personality interest, can fulfill
this last piece of the puzzle by helping consumers rediscover the value in music.

